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551 
Does Miranda Protect the  
Innocent or the Guilty? 
Steven B. Duke* 
Miranda v. Arizona1 is probably the most widely recognized 
court decision ever rendered.  Thanks to movies and television, 
people the world over know about “Miranda rights.”  Govern-
ments around the globe have embraced Miranda-like rights.  
Suspects in South Korea must receive their “Miranda warning” 
before being interrogated.2  So must those in Mexico,3  Canada,4 
and most European countries.5  Miranda’s notoriety surely has 
something to do with the decision’s kaleidoscopic symbolism.  To 
some, Miranda embodies the respect due to criminal suspects.6  
 
 *  Professor of Law, Yale Law School.  This article is an elaboration of remarks made 
at the Chapman Law Review Symposium: Miranda at 40: Applications in a Post-Enron, 
Post-9/11 World (Jan. 26, 2007).  I am indebted to Theresa Cullen, Sarah Raymond and 
Geoffrey Starks for their research assistance. 
 1 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 2 The Korean Constitution protects the right against self-incrimination and Korean 
courts have held that, in “the Korean version of Miranda,” police must advise suspects of 
their right to silence prior to interrogation.  If police fail to do so, any resulting statement 
is inadmissible.  Kuk Cho, The Unfinished “Criminal Procedure Revolution” of Post-
Democratization South Korea, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 377, 383 (2002). 
 3 The Political Constitution of the Mexican United States, art. 20, provides that the 
defendant has a right not to be compelled to give a statement and to be informed of his 
right to remain silent.  It further provides that any “confession rendered before whatever 
authority destined by the Public Minister or the judge, or before these without the assis-
tance of counsel of any value shall be prohibited.”  INSTITUTO FEDERAL ELECTORAL, 
POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE MEXICAN UNITED STATES 14 (1994). 
 4 Craig M. Bradley, The Emerging International Consensus as to Criminal Proce-
dure Rules, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 171, 198 (1993). 
 5 See generally Craig M. Bradley, Mapp Goes Abroad, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375 
(2001) (surveying  the rules in more than ten countries); Gordon Van Kessel, Quieting the 
Guilty and Acquitting the Innocent: A Close Look at a New Twist on the Right to Silence, 
35 IND. L. REV. 925 (2002).  
Throughout Europe, there is near-universal recognition of a right to si-
lence . . . that applies to both the pretrial and trial stages of a criminal case.  
Those aspects of the right . . . that require advice of the right and prohibit ad-
verse inferences from silence also are generally accepted.  Most civil law coun-
tries of continental Europe have adopted rules that require suspects be in-
formed of the right to remain silent prior to questioning as well as rules that 
prohibit courts from considering [a] defendant’s silence as evidence of guilt . . . . 
Id. at 926. 
 6 “Miranda . . . allows us to celebrate our values of individualism without paying 
any real price.  As a cultural symbol, Miranda stands for the enshrinement of individual 
rights over the needs of the state for efficiency, equal justice for rich and poor before the 
law . . . .”  Patrick A. Malone, “You Have the Right to Remain Silent”: Miranda after 
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To others, it represents the professionalism of the police.7  Still 
others regard Miranda as a glaring example of the Supreme 
Court’s ambivalence toward law enforcement, its lack of respect 
for victims, and its willingness to “coddle criminals.”8  Constitu-
tional lawyers cite Miranda as an example of judicial usurpation 
of the legislative domain.9  And so on. 
Rather than musing about the symbolic meaning of 
Miranda, I want to examine a more mundane, yet eminently 
practical, question: whether Miranda protects the innocent, the 
guilty, or neither.  That is an empirical question that we cannot 
answer with entirely convincing proof; we can only debate and 
opine, which we have already been doing for more than four dec-
ades.  It is hard to conjure any other subject that has so occupied 
law reviews, television dramas, talk shows, and op-eds.   It may 
now be impossible to say anything original on the subject and 
since I have read only some of the debates, I can make no claim 
here of originality.10  Nonetheless, some answers seem clear 
enough that we should focus our concern about confessions in 
 
Twenty Years (1986), reprinted in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 75, 
85 (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III eds., 1998). 
 7 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and 
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 504 (1996). 
 8 See, e.g., Maxwell Bloomfield, The Warren Court in American Fiction, 1991 J. SUP. 
CT. HIST. 86 (1991), available at http://www.supremecourthistory.org/04_library/ 
subs_volumes/04_c09_l.html; Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. 
REV. 237, 244 (“Looking at the ensuing criticism of the decision, one would think that the 
Court had opened the prisons and handed guns to departing murderers.”). 
 9 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION: ‘TRUTH IN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE’ REPORT NO. 1 (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH J.L. REFORM 437, 543 (1989) 
(“Miranda violates the constitutional separation of powers and basic principles of federal-
ism.  Miranda’s promulgation of a code of procedure for interrogations constituted a usur-
pation of legislative and administrative powers . . . .”); Dickerson v. United States, 530 
U.S. 428, 457–61 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 10 In an effort to be original, some supporters and critics alike stretch pretty far.  
Daniel Seidmann and Alex Stein, for example, spend eighty pages arguing that when the 
guilty exercise the right to silence they help the innocent: if the guilty had to talk, they 
would lie and their lies would make factfinders more skeptical of the innocents’ truthful 
denials.  Thus, even though the right to silence directly protects the guilty, it indirectly 
protects the innocent as well.  Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence 
Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 430, 433–34 (2000).  Professor Cassell floated a somewhat contradictory 
theory, that if the police are stymied in their efforts to obtain confessions from the guilty, 
they will wring false confessions from the innocent.  Ergo, they should be freer to obtain 
confessions from everyone.  Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confes-
sions and Lost Confessions—and from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 498–
99 (1998).  For responses to Seidmann & Stein, see Stephanos Bibas, The Right to Remain 
Silent Helps Only the Guilty, 88 IOWA L. REV. 421 (2003) and  Van Kessel, supra note 5, at 
930–31.  For a response to Cassell, see Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Using the In-
nocent to Scapegoat Miranda: Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J. CRIM L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 557 (1998). 
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other directions.  We should give Miranda a rest. 
Part of what fuels the vast literature about Miranda are the 
multitudinous meanings of the subject of the debate.  When we 
speak of Miranda, are we referring to the opinion of the Warren 
Court in June 1966, which was a mini-treatise on the hows and 
whys and the good and bad of police interrogation, or to the 
warnings that Miranda requires the police to give suspects dur-
ing custodial interrogation?  Do we also include in that reference 
the Court’s directives about how the police should respond when 
the suspect invokes his rights?  And do we include what the 
Court said about how the trial court should deal with various 
eventualities?11  Since most of Miranda’s dicta have been disre-
garded by courts and the police in the four decades since the case 
was decided, should we disregard that dicta as well when debat-
ing the present-day impact of Miranda?12 
In contemplating Miranda’s effects on convicting the guilty 
and the innocent, we might also ask what assumptions we are 
making about how the legal landscape relating to police interro-
gation would look today if Miranda had never been decided, or if, 
as some have been seeking for four decades, it had been over-
ruled. 
In some of the debates, Miranda is regarded as having 
clearly established (or “invented,” some would say) the Fifth 
Amendment’s applicability to police interrogation.  But that is 
untrue.  Bram v. United States did that in l897, when the Court 
said, “[W]herever a question arises whether a confession is in-
competent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by [the 
self-incrimination] portion of the Fifth Amendment . . . .”13  The 
Court reaffirmed the Bram position in Malloy v. Hogan,14 which 
preceded Miranda.  If we assume, as some of Miranda’s critics 
astonishingly do, that before Miranda was decided, the police 
were free to compel a suspect to answer their questions,15 we 
 
 11 For example, the Court said that the prosecution could not use as evidence at trial 
the fact that the suspect declined to submit to interrogation, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 468 n.37 (1966), and could not use a confession obtained without a waiver of the 
Miranda rights.  Id. at 475–76.   
 12 For some of that dicta, see infra note 18. 
 13 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). 
 14 378 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964). 
 15 See, e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth:  The Professional In-
terrogator and Modern Confessions Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 662, 683–84, 686 (1986) (re-
viewing FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 
(1962)) (noting that historically, the Fifth Amendment only applied to formal judicial pro-
ceedings, not to out-of-court investigations, so whatever the police did in interrogations 
was not “compelled” self-incrimination within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment).  See 
also the famous refutation of these claims in Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gate-
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might attribute to Miranda some substantial curbs on police ac-
tivities and a reduction in confessions.  But if the only innovation 
we attribute to Miranda is the duty it imposed on the police to 
deliver the four-part advisement of rights and to respect the sus-
pect’s express desire to cut off questioning, a very different con-
clusion about Miranda’s effects might emerge.  In attacks on 
Miranda as criminogenic or at least hindering law enforcement, 
the critics are rarely clear about what version or interpretation of 
Miranda they find so friendly to felons. 
Professor, now Judge, Paul Cassell is in the vanguard of 
Miranda’s critics, writing a dozen or more law review articles at-
tempting to prove that Miranda was not only misguided, but 
perverse.16  Unlike some of his allies, Paul Cassell is reasonably 
clear about the Miranda that he is criticizing, at least in his more 
recent articles on the subject.  It is the skeletal Miranda that has 
emerged after decades of judicially-inflicted erosion, a Miranda 
that requires no more than the four-part warning and the right 
to cut off questioning.17  That was not the Miranda that police 
thought they were trying to comply with in the immediate wake 
 
houses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, From 
Escobedo to . . . , in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 1, 19–36 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 
1965).  See also Stephen A. Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: Constitutional Law 
or Judicial Fiat?, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 14 (1986) (arguing that the drafters of the Self-
Incrimination Clause could not have intended to prohibit judges from compelling self-
incrimination, but to permit other officials to do so in secret sessions without any judicial 
protection).  Miranda also declared that the prosecution could not use as evidence at trial 
the fact that the suspect declined to submit to interrogation.  384 U.S. at 468 n.37.  This 
extended to the police station the Court’s earlier ruling in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 
609, 615 (1965), that no adverse inference can be drawn at trial from the suspect’s exer-
cise of his Fifth Amendment right. 
 16 See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 10, at 503; Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police 
Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. 
REV. 839, 842–43 (1996).   
 17 Since Cassell has himself proposed a set of warnings which include the right to 
silence, his major objection is not to the warnings themselves but to the suspect’s right to 
cut off questioning.  See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 16, at 859 (“[I]t appears that most 
of Miranda’s harms stem from the cutoff rules, not the more famous Miranda warnings.”).  
Cassell’s own data suggest, however, that suspects rarely cut off questioning after they 
have made their initial “waiver.”  In Cassell and Hayman’s study of interrogations in 
Utah, 83.7% of interrogated suspects waived their rights and only 3.9% changed their 
minds later.  Id. at 860.  See also similar data cited in note 19, infra.  Cassell’s objections 
to Miranda might therefore appear almost trivial were it not that he also wants to permit 
the police to continue to interrogate and cajole suspects who invoke their rights at any 
point in the process, whether from the outset or later.  Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social 
Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 497 (1996).  In effect, Cassell’s 
proposal would tell the police that they need not respect the suspect’s right to silence and 
can ignore his attempts to invoke it.  Such disrespect for the suspect’s Miranda rights has 
never enjoyed support in the Supreme Court.  Rather, fairly strict enforcement of the cut-
off rules has been the norm.  See, e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 106 (1975); Ari-
zona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 686–87 (1988); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156 
(1990). 
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of the decision.  Many thought that Miranda made lawful inter-
rogation almost impossible.18 
I.  THE LIKELY IMPACT OF NO MIRANDA WARNINGS 
In the interest of clarity, let us speculate about only one 
thing: what would be the likely effect on police interrogation, and 
on convicting the innocent and the guilty, if America repudiated 
the international movement that it spawned and told the police 
not only that they were not required to warn suspects of their 
rights, but that they were forbidden to do so? 
About four out of five custodial suspects in the United States 
who are asked to submit to interrogation do so, while one in five 
declines.  Those who decline usually do so when warned initially, 
but occasionally do so later in the course of the interrogation.19  
Paul Cassell claims that the Miranda warnings cause suspects to 
clam up (or at least to not confess) and that, as a result, many 
criminals avoid conviction.  Professor Cassell even asserted that 
“Miranda may be the single most damaging blow inflicted on the 
 
 18 The Miranda opinion clearly contemplates that in the typical police interrogation 
the suspect will have counsel at his side.  If that were the case, there would be very few 
interrogations.  Many statements in Miranda created uncertainty about the continuing 
viability of custodial interrogation: “[T]he very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a 
heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals,” Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966); “Our aim is to assure that the individual’s right to 
choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation proc-
ess. . . . A mere warning given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish 
that end,” Id. at 469–70; “[A] heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that 
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination 
and his right to retained or appointed counsel,” id. at 475; “If authorities conclude that 
they will not provide counsel . . . they may refrain from doing so without violating the per-
son’s Fifth Amendment privilege so long as they do not question him during that time,” 
id. at 474; “Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of rights by an accused, 
the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado  incarceration before a statement is 
made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights,” id. at 476; 
“[A]ny evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of 
course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege.” Id.  As it turned 
out, none of these statements has current vitality in the courts, but they caused difficul-
ties in police interrogation in the first few years after Miranda was decided. 
 19 See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 
266, 302 (1996) [hereinafter Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room]; Cassell, supra note 17, 
at 495–96.  Although the Court in Miranda stated that the suspect has the right to termi-
nate questioning at any time, 384 U.S. at 445, 476 n.45,  the Court did not require that 
the suspect be informed of that right and the police rarely add that bit of advice to the 
warnings.  Whether for that reason or others, if suspects do not invoke silence at the out-
set, they rarely change their minds and terminate the interrogation midstream.  See Pro-
ject, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1554–55 
(1967); Cassell & Hayman, supra note 16, at 860 & tbl.3; Richard A. Leo, The Impact of 
Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 653 tbl.1 (1996) [hereinafter Leo, 
The Impact of Miranda Revisited] (stating that of 182 Mirandized suspects, 38 invoked 
their Miranda rights but only 2 of those did so after an initial waiver). 
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nation’s ability to fight crime in the last half century.”20 
Professor Stephen Schulhofer and others have taken issue 
with Cassell’s conclusions.21  Studies conducted after the police 
learned to minimize Miranda’s strictures and courts began to en-
courage such minimization provide very little support for Cas-
sell’s analysis, most of which is based on “confession rates.” Cas-
sell says that the confession rates are somewhat lower in the 
United States than in England and Canada, where police have 
long given pre-interrogation warnings that are less detailed than 
those required by Miranda.22  There are, of course, many factors 
that can influence confession rates that have nothing to do with 
the content of a pre-interrogation warning or whether one was 
given.  Interrogation rates vary greatly among jurisdictions and 
police departments within the same state.  If, for example, the 
police interrogate only people whom they have arrested and 
whom they believe to be guilty, confession rates should be high.  
If, in contrast, the police frequently interrogate persons whom 
they have not arrested or against whom they have little evidence, 
the confession rates will be lower.  If police regard interrogation 
as merely a step in the investigation process, they are less likely 
to experience a high confession rate than if they regard interro-
gation as a phase of the prosecution.   
Other reasons for variations in interrogation rates include 
differences in the interrogation expertise of the police, in the time 
available to the police to conduct interrogations, and the urgency 
or necessity of the interrogation.  Interrogations occur only when 
the police feel a need to conduct them and are rare where the 
perpetrator is caught in the act or is in possession of contraband 
or stolen property shortly after the crime.23  The need for a con-
fession also varies with the nature of the crimes that are being 
investigated, and those natures vary over time and jurisdictions.  
Many crimes simply are not serious enough to warrant custodial 
interrogation.  The difficulties of concluding, based on differences 
in confession rates, that criminals are being helped by Miranda 
warnings are insuperable. 
 
 20 Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspec-
tive on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1132 
(1998). 
 21 Schulhofer, supra note 7, at 547 (“For all practical purposes, Miranda’s empiri-
cally detectable net damage to law enforcement is zero.”).  See also Richard A. Leo, Ques-
tioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 
1007–09 & nn.41–51 (2001); George C. Thomas III, Plain Talk about the Miranda Debate: 
A “Steady-State” Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REV. 933, 942–43 (1996). 
 22 See Cassell, supra note 19, at 418–22. 
 23 See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 16, at 854–59 (exploring reasons why Utah po-
lice did not interrogate); Project, supra note 19, at 1582–93. 
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Some critics focus alternatively on the numbers or proportion 
of suspects who decline to converse with the police—those who 
invoke their right to silence.  As noted, those rates hover around 
twenty percent.24  Some seem to assume that whoever refuses to 
submit to interrogation after being warned of his rights does so 
because of the warning.  But that is the post hoc, ergo propter hoc 
fallacy: temporal succession does not establish cause and effect.  
Some suspects refused to talk to the police before Miranda.25   
Even before Miranda, physical coercion was rare in Ameri-
can police departments.26  Thus, a pre-Miranda suspect, even if 
not informed of his right to silence, often knew that he could not 
be forced to talk and that if he refused, he would suffer at most 
an adverse inference and a lost opportunity to talk himself out of 
trouble.  When the Miranda warning regime began, the warnings 
did not tell many suspects much, if anything, that they did not 
already know.27  Possibly as many as twenty percent of suspects 
in the pre-Miranda era invoked silence.28  More pertinent to the 
debate today, however, is how many suspects would invoke si-
 
 24 See Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 19, at 302. 
 25 Id.  In the New Haven study, of 127 suspects, 20 immediately refused to talk and 
18  asked to see a lawyer or friend before receiving any warnings.  It is unclear whether 
the 20 who refused to talk were different than the 18 who asked to see a lawyer or a 
friend.  If they were, then 30% of all suspects invoked their rights without warnings.  If 
they were the same suspects, then about 16% invoked their rights. 
 26 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 446–48 (1966) (noting that in the time leading 
up to Miranda, physical brutality was the exception, and that most coercion was psycho-
logical); Project, supra note 19, at 1549. 
 27 A pre-Miranda suspect might have been unaware that his silence could not be 
used against him at trial, a rule declared in Miranda, id. at 468 n.37, but this is not part 
of the required Miranda warnings.  Moreover, common sense suggests that whatever the 
rule about adverse inferences at trial, the police will draw an adverse inference against 
one who refuses to cooperate, and this is the adverse inference that is uppermost in the 
suspect’s mind. 
 28 See Project, supra note 19, at 1571 n.135 (between 16% and 30% of New Haven 
suspects invoked silence without being warned).  In a pre-Miranda study in Philadelphia 
in 1965, out of 4801 persons arrested, 1550, or slightly less than 32%, “refused to give a 
statement.”  However, they were given some warnings, even before Miranda, so they can-
not all be counted as persons who would have “refused to give a statement” without any 
warnings at all.  Controlling Crime through More Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
90th Cong. 200 (1967) (statement of Arlen Specter, District Att’y of Phila.).  In one Cali-
fornia city, during a three-month period in 1960, detectives conducted interrogations of 
399 persons arrested for felonies.  Of those, 58.1% gave confessions or admissions.  Ed-
ward L. Barrett, Jr., Police Practices and the Law—from Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 
CAL. L. REV. 11, 43 (1962).  Barrett does not report how many of the other 41.9% talked 
and how many refused but it would be surprising if most of that group submitted to inter-
rogation but did not say anything incriminating.  The scholarly literature on interrogation 
practices and consequences pre-Miranda is surprisingly sparse.  See Ronald H. Beattie, 
Criminal Statistics in the United States—1960, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE 
SCI. 49 (1960); Caleb Foote, Law and Police Practice: Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 
NW. U. L. REV. 16, 17 (1957). 
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lence if police stopped warning suspects of their rights.  That 
number could approach, or, paradoxically, even exceed the 
twenty percent who now invoke silence after receiving warnings. 
It nonetheless seems almost certain that Miranda warnings 
do cause some suspects to reject interrogation.29  Some, perhaps 
even most, of those silence-invoking suspects are guilty.30  Even if 
we further assume that because they invoke silence, some of 
those guilty suspects avoid conviction,31 it still does not follow 
that the net effect of Miranda warnings is to impede convicting 
the guilty. 
We must also consider the possibility that the warnings ac-
tually induce some suspects to talk rather than to remain silent.  
The warnings implicitly suggest to the suspect that the police are 
respectful of the suspect’s rights, that the police are not only law-
abiding, but that they are also fair and objective.  If delivered 
with the proper tone, the warnings could even suggest to the 
suspect that the investigators are sympathetic, naïve or gulli-
ble.32  Surely Patrick Malone is right that “[s]killfully presented, 
 
 29 See Project, supra note 19, at 1571 tbl.17.  This would seem to be true even if the 
warnings impart no new or significant information to the suspect.  They do at least intro-
duce the issue of silence and make it easier for the suspect to invoke silence than if there 
had been no mention of the matter by the police, requiring the suspect to raise the issue 
himself. 
 30 There is, as far as I am aware, no evidence that virtually everyone who invokes 
silence is guilty, as is sometimes assumed by scholars.  See, e.g., Seidmann & Stein, supra 
note 10, at 503.  There is evidence that suspects with felony records are much more likely 
to invoke silence than those whose records are clear, see Leo, Inside the Interrogation 
Room, supra note 19, at 286, but concluding that they are more likely to be guilty because 
they have criminal records seems unwarranted.  A different conclusion does seem justi-
fied:  they invoke silence more often because their previous experience with the police 
taught them the advantages of silence.  See William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 975, 993 (2001).  While it will often end up to his advantage to cooperate 
with law enforcement, the guilty suspect should rarely cooperate without a quid pro quo.  
Hence, it is usually unwise for guilty suspects to cooperate during custodial interrogation.  
Nonetheless, about 60% to 80% of suspects who submit to interrogation end up confessing 
or making incriminating statements.  See, e.g., Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra 
note 19, at 281; James W. Witt, Non-Coercive Interrogation and the Administration of 
Criminal Justice: The Impact of Miranda on Police Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 320, 326 tbl.3 (1973). 
 31 There appear to be no studies correlating silence-invoking with conviction, i.e., 
what proportion of those who invoke silence are not convicted.  Nor do there appear to be 
any studies attempting to show what proportion of those silence invokers are factually 
guilty. 
 32 Since courts are permissive in allowing the police to preface the warnings with 
their own observations and even to intermix their own observations with the warnings, 
see, e.g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 201–05 (1989), the police can suggest during 
the warning process that they are sympathetic to the suspect, that the victim “got what 
she deserved” or “I would probably have done the same thing.”  This signals to the suspect 
that he is among sympathetic interrogators.  The belief, or hope, that they can talk their 
way out of trouble is a major motivator for suspects to submit to interrogation.  See Saul 
M. Kassin & Rebecca J. Norwick, Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: The Power of 
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the Miranda warnings themselves sound chords of fairness and 
sympathy at the outset of the interrogation.  The interrogator 
who advises, who cautions, who offers the suspect the gift of a 
free lawyer, becomes all the more persuasive by dint of his ap-
parent candor and reasonableness.”33  If a cop tells the suspect 
that he need not answer, that he can have an attorney if he 
wants, is that not reassuring?  The Court repeatedly said so in its 
Miranda opinion.34  The Court’s notion that a mere warning 
would transform the interrogation from one of “inherent coer-
cion” to an occasion for the suspect “to tell his story without fear” 
was astonishingly naïve, since the warnings lose most of what-
ever significance they have once the interrogation begins.35  
However, there was some truth to the Court’s observation that 
the warnings serve to reassure and calm the suspect into waiving 
his rights at the outset of the interrogation.  The warnings may 
also increase the suspect’s bravado during the early stages of in-
terrogation, which of course facilitates the interrogators.36  So, 
against the guilty who are induced not to talk by the warnings, 
we have to compare the guilty who are induced to talk.37  Which 
is the larger group?  Nobody knows.  It seems reasonable to 
 
Innocence, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 215–16 (2004); George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s 
Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1111 
(2003) (reviewing WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS (2001)).  For other 
techniques police use to encourage waivers, see Leo, supra note 21, at 1019. 
 33 Malone, supra note 6, at 79.  A similar point is made in George C. Thomas III, Is 
Miranda a Real-World Failure? A Plea for More (and Better) Empirical Evidence, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 821, 831 (1996). 
 34 The Court suggested that the warnings would “relieve the defendant of the anxie-
ties [the police] created in the interrogation rooms,” 384 U.S. 436, 465 (1966), would en-
able him “under otherwise compelling circumstances to tell his story without fear, effec-
tively, and in a way that eliminates the evils in the interrogation process,” id. at 466, and 
are “an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation 
atmosphere.” Id. at 468. 
 35 “[O]nce suspects agree to talk to the police, they almost never call a halt to ques-
tioning or invoke their right to have assistance of counsel.”  Stuntz, supra note 30, at 977.  
“Once the interrogator recites the fourfold warnings and obtains a waiver . . . Miranda is 
irrelevant to both the process and the outcome of the subsequent interrogation.  Any pro-
tection that Miranda might have offered a suspect typically evaporates as soon as an ac-
cusatory interrogation begins . . . .”  Leo, supra note 21, at 1015.  See also supra note 19.  
Miranda’s naïveté has often been repeated by the Supreme Court.  In Davis v. United 
States, for example, the Court said, “[T]he primary protection afforded suspects subject to 
custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves” and that “comprehension of 
the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever coer-
cion is inherent in the interrogation process.”  512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994) (quoting Moran v. 
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)). 
 36 The New Haven study provides some support for this speculation.  Law students 
observed all police interrogations in New Haven during the summer of 1966.  Suspects 
who were warned of their rights made incriminating statements far more often (in 57% of 
the interrogations) than those who were not warned (30%).  See Project, supra note 19, at 
1565.  A major motivator for suspects to waive their rights is their hope that they can talk 
themselves out of trouble.  See supra note 32. 
 37 A similar point is alluded to in Thomas III, supra note 33, at 831. 
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speculate, however, that after four decades of living with 
Miranda, the small number of suspects who are induced to re-
main silent by the administration of the warnings is getting even 
smaller while the number encouraged to talk is at least remain-
ing stable. 
Let us assume arguendo that the number of those induced to 
remain silent by the warnings exceed those who are induced to 
talk.  If so, then the number of suspects who actually submit to 
interrogation is somewhat reduced by the Miranda warnings—
albeit much less than is commonly supposed.38  There is little 
reason to assume that this number is more than three or four 
percent of those who are interrogated.  Assuming such a net fig-
ure, however, still does not answer the question of whether the 
guilty are helped or hurt by Miranda warnings. 
If slightly fewer suspects submit to interrogation because of 
Miranda warnings, there is no reason to doubt that those who do 
submit continue to confess or make incriminating statements (in-
cluding provable lies) at the same or at a higher rate than would 
have been the case without warnings.39  Once the police obtain a 
waiver, the trickery and psychological coercion that the Court 
noted in Miranda, together with any new interrogating tricks 
learned since then, can continue as before.40  As long as the police 
do not physically torture the suspect or threaten him with imme-
diate bodily harm, virtually anything goes.41 
II.  THE COUNTERWEIGHT OF COGENCY 
Assuming that a fraction of guilty suspects who would oth-
erwise incriminate themselves do not do so because of the 
Miranda warnings, and that because they invoked their right to 
remain silent they cannot be convicted, there are two strong 
counterbalancing effects of the warnings that almost certainly 
 
 38 Despite Miranda warnings, most suspects who are warned (78% to 96%) waive 
their rights.  Richard A. Leo, Miranda and the Problem of False Confessions, in THE 
MIRANDA DEBATE, supra note 6, at 271, 275. 
 39 It is often assumed that the guilty are more likely to invoke silence than the inno-
cent.  See, e.g., Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 19, at 279 n.71.  If so, there 
might be a slight reduction in the harvesting of incriminating statements if the proportion 
of silence-invokers were slightly increased by the giving of warnings.  But that would be 
true only if (1) the guilty make incriminating statements more often than the innocent 
(we certainly hope this is true!), and (2) the reduction in the numbers of suspects submit-
ting to interrogation is not more than offset by the ill-advised bravado and garrulity that 
the warnings engender. 
 40 See Leo, supra note 21, at 1003. 
 41 See Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Prac-
tices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211 (2001). 
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outweigh those losses.42  The first is the cogency effect of the 
warnings and the waiver.  A jury is more likely to believe that a 
defendant’s incriminating statements were truthful if he received 
Miranda warnings.  One who receives warnings but nonetheless 
“waives” his rights to silence and to have a lawyer present 
thereby makes his incriminating statements appear more clearly 
voluntary and reliable than if he made them without any warn-
ings or waivers.  According to the Miranda court, the warnings 
serve to dilute or even to eliminate the coercive nature of police 
interrogation.43  A Mirandized suspect who talks is arguably do-
ing so without coercion, even if interrogated for half a day,44 
whereas one who is not Mirandized is, according to the Supreme 
Court, being interrogated in an “inherently coercive” atmos-
phere.45  When coercion is seemingly eliminated or reduced, the 
suspect’s incriminating statements acquire more cogency.  Al-
though the Supreme Court’s view of the power of a simple warn-
ing to calm and comfort the suspect throughout a lengthy inter-
rogation was extremely naïve, prosecutors are free to make the 
same argument to juries who will surely find it persuasive.  In 
sum, although Miranda warnings may deter a small fraction of 
suspects from incriminating themselves, those who are not de-
terred are more likely to be convicted because their incriminating 
statements acquire cogency from the warning and the waiver.  In 
its power to produce convictions, this cogency effect could out-
weigh the evidence lost, if any, by the Miranda warnings. 
Miranda’s contribution to the cogency of a confession may be 
unnecessary, since juries are likely to believe a confession under 
almost any circumstances.46  However, while confessions are ob-
tained in many interrogations, they are by no means the typical 
result of an interrogation.  According to Richard A. Leo’s study of 
l82 interrogations in the early l990s, incriminating statements 
 
 42 The first counterbalancing effect is discussed in this Part.  The second is discussed 
in Part III. 
 43 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).  As the Court noted in Miranda, 
the pre-Miranda  interrogation manuals suggested that if a suspect is reluctant to discuss 
the matter, he should be told that he has a right to remain silent and “[t]his usually has a 
very undermining effect.  First of all, he is disappointed in his expectation of an unfavor-
able reaction on the part of the interrogator.  Secondly, a concession of this right to re-
main silent impresses the subject with the apparent fairness of his interrogator.”  Id. at 
453–54 (quoting from FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND 
CONFESSIONS 111 (1962)). 
 44 See State v. LaPointe, 678 A.2d 942, 949, 964 (Conn. 1996) (holding that confes-
sions obtained from a suspect with a congenital brain defect during a nine-and-a-half hour 
interrogation was voluntary, even though detectives wrote the confessions he signed). 
 45 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
 46 See infra note 86. 
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were obtained in 64%, but only 24% produced full confessions.47  
Thus, nearly two-thirds of the incriminating statements resulting 
from interrogations are not confessions and need the help of the 
cogency counterweight. 
III.  THE COUNTERBALANCING EFFECT OF MIRANDA ON JUDGES 
A second weighty counterbalance is the effect that Miranda 
warnings have on judges: psychologically, politically and doctri-
nally.  If warnings were delivered by the police and a waiver was 
given or signed, it is almost impossible to persuade a judge that 
the resultant confession or admission is “involuntary.”48  The 
warning/waiver not only helps to persuade the jury of the defen-
dant’s guilt, it helps the trial judge deny the defendant’s motion 
to suppress.49  The focus of the pre-Miranda judicial inquiry has 
been shifted from whether the confession was voluntary to 
whether the Miranda warnings were given and a waiver exe-
cuted.  This shift makes granting a motion to suppress difficult 
and makes denying it easy.50  I do not think the waiver adds 
much, if anything, to the voluntariness of a confession, but I am 
not a judge who would be the target of the public clamor that in-
evitably follows a judicial ruling suppressing incriminating evi-
dence despite police compliance with Miranda.  Miranda is a 
substantial factor in the twenty-first century reality that the 
suppression of confessions by trial judges on involuntariness 
grounds is almost as rare today as four-legged chickens.51 
 
 47 Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 19, at 280. 
 48 White, supra note 41, at 1220.  
 49 As the Court observed in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), when 
the police have “adhered to the dictates of Miranda,” the accused can rarely make even “a 
colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled.’”  Id. at 444 (quot-
ing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984)). 
 50 As Professor Leo notes, “[T]rial judges have learned to use Miranda to simplify the 
decision to admit interrogation-induced statements and to sanitize confessions that might 
otherwise be deemed involuntary if analyzed solely under the more rigorous Fourteenth 
Amendment due process voluntariness standard.”  Leo, supra note 21, at 1027. 
 51 In a study of 7035 cases in three states, Professor Nardulli found only five (.07%) 
cases that were lost as a result of a court’s suppression of a confession.  Peter F. Nardulli, 
The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 585, 601.  In a subsequent study of 2759 cases in Chicago, judges suppressed con-
fessions in only .04% of all cases.  Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Costs of the Exclusionary 
Rule Revisited, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 223, 227, 232.  In a Westlaw search of all federal and 
state cases decided in 1999 and 2000, Welsh White found only nine cases in which the 
courts held a post-waiver confession involuntary.  Four of those cases were expressly 
based on state law rather than the Due Process Clause.  White, supra note 41, at 1219 
n.54.  It seems likely, moreover, that violations of Miranda’s warning and waiver rules 
were present in some of those cases.  I asked a long-time trial judge recently if he had 
ever suppressed a confession.  He said, with apparent pride, “yes.”  I asked him for the 
details and he explained that the police had questioned the suspect without administering 
any Miranda warnings.  “Did the State lose the case?” I asked.  “No,” he replied.  “After 
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IV.  DIMINISHED CONCERN FOR THE INNOCENT 
Before Miranda, a major concern of the Supreme Court was 
the voluntariness of confessions.  The Court was developing some 
rather stringent (if unclear) requirements on the admissibility of 
confessions.52  Miranda, however, has been a major contributor to 
the demise of that concern and to an inversion of the law govern-
ing involuntary confessions.  Many confessions that would have 
been found involuntary in 1966 are considered voluntary today.   
The currently-applied tests for voluntariness are less de-
manding than the pre-Miranda tests.53  Even more important 
than its articulation of voluntariness criteria is the message the 
Supreme Court sends to the lower courts in its case selection and 
decision patterns.  In the three decades prior to Miranda, the 
Supreme Court held that confessions were involuntary in at least 
twenty-three cases.54  In the four decades since Miranda, how-
ever, the Court has decided only three voluntariness cases, and 
has only held two confessions involuntary: Mincey v. Arizona55 
and Arizona v. Fulminante.56  The Court has also moved from a 
voluntariness test related to the reliability of the confession to a 
doctrine that explicitly rejects such a concern.  Police misconduct, 
not reliability, is now the sole determinant of involuntariness.57  
 
they got the confession, they Mirandized him and got another confession, which was ad-
missible.  He was convicted.”  Cf. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 300 (1985).  For an espe-
cially unusual case, an appellate ruling holding a confession involuntary, see Common-
wealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Mass. 2004), where a conviction for 
burning a building, in which no one was injured, rested largely on the defendant’s confes-
sion, which was obtained through lies about nonexistent evidence, expressions of sympa-
thy, and minimization of the offense with implicit offers of leniency.  Perhaps four-legged 
chickens are slightly more common than judicial findings of involuntariness.  See Posting 
of Bart Dabek to Science & Technology, http://www.aboutmyplanet.com/index.php?s=four-
legged+chicken (Mar. 15, 2007). 
 52 See generally Yale Kamisar, What is an “Involuntary” Confession? Some Com-
ments on Inbau and Reid’s Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 
728, 741 (1963); Welsh S. White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 2001, 2008–20 (1998). 
 53 Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 745–46 (1992) 
(stating that because the Supreme Court is not interested in reviewing voluntariness 
cases, “lower courts have adopted an attitude toward voluntariness claims that can only 
be called cavalier”); White, supra note 51, at 2009 (“[P]olice interrogators have in some 
respects been afforded greater freedom than they were during the era immediately pre-
ceding Miranda.”). 
 54 White, supra note 41, at 1220. 
 55 437 U.S. 385, 401 (1978). 
 56 499 U.S. 279, 282 (1991).  The third case was Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 
159 (1986), discussed infra. 
 57 Professor Godsey observes that prior to Miranda, the Court in its voluntariness 
decisions emphasized the subjectivities of the suspect, such as his age, background, 
strength of character, and mental condition at the time of the interrogation, but Miranda 
made these concerns virtually irrelevant to its “waiver” questions.  Mark A. Godsey, Re-
thinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying Com-
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Although the Court in Miranda took full note of the coercive 
pressures of custodial interrogation and the effectiveness of psy-
chological coercion, including the power to obtain confessions 
from the innocent,58 the remedy the Court fashioned to counter-
act those pressures is almost totally ineffective.  In what has be-
come essentially a faux remedy, the Miranda warning regime 
has virtually replaced a vibrant and developing voluntariness in-
quiry that took into account the vulnerabilities of the particular 
suspect as well as the inducements and conditions of the interro-
gation.  As far as the Supreme Court is concerned, that protec-
tion of the innocent has vanished from the law of confessions. 
In its immediate aftermath, the Miranda decision was com-
monly believed to do much more than prescribe a set of warnings 
and related rights.  Some thought that defense lawyers would 
have to be assigned to police stations and to participate in all in-
terrogations.59  Many thought that this would virtually eliminate 
confessions as tools for convicting the guilty.60  There is language 
in the opinion that supported many of these fears and predic-
tions.61  But none of them came to pass.  As others have noted in 
countless law review articles, the courts have pretty much cut 
the flesh out of the Miranda opinion and left it with only its 
skeleton—the four-part warnings and the right to cut off ques-
tioning.62 
The Miranda court explained at length how police use psy-
chological coercion to obtain confessions without using force or 
 
pelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465, 489–90 (2005).  As a result, the tests of 
confession admissibility after Miranda had virtually nothing to do with reliability.  See 
also White, supra note 52, at 2021–23 (1998).  The rejection of reliability concerns was 
made complete and total in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 159 (1986), where the 
Court held that a confession that was ordered by the “voice of God” and made by a psy-
chotic was nonetheless “voluntary.” 
 58 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 n.24 (1966). 
 59 Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, supra note 19, at 672. 
 60 As Donald Dripps observes, Miranda was preceded by Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 
U.S. 478, 492 (1964), in which the Court held that there is a Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel whenever the police begin to “focus” on the suspect.  This “implied the end of po-
lice interrogation.”  DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS, 
DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 75 (2003).  
Miranda implicitly rejected both the Sixth Amendment’s application and the “focus” test, 
and thereby “saved police interrogation from the jaws of Escobedo.”  Id. at 76.  By substi-
tuting the Fifth Amendment for the Sixth, the Miranda court allowed interrogation with 
its dubious holding that one who is in an “inherently coercive” environment can nonethe-
less waive the right to silence. 
 61 See supra note 18. 
 62 What survives the four-decade erosion of Miranda are the following requirements: 
(1) to give the four-part warnings prior to obtaining an admissible confession in a custo-
dial setting, (2) to respect  the suspect’s invocation of silence, and (3) to respect his re-
quest for the assistance of counsel.  In (2) or (3), all “interrogation must cease.” Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 473–74. 
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threats of force—how they lie to the suspects, create phony accu-
satory witnesses, falsely accuse suspects of other crimes, promise 
leniency and employ phony expressions of sympathy—and the 
Court seemingly disapproved of these methods.63  Yet lower 
courts have, with virtual unanimity, condoned them all.64  Once 
the Miranda warnings are given, the old techniques continue.  
Some new ones have been added, like asking the suspect, who 
denies guilt, to imagine or dream about how he might have done 
it if he had done it—as in O.J. Simpson’s recent unpublished 
book, If I Did It.65  Once the suspect articulates a fanciful sce-
nario of guilt, he then is pressured to admit that the fantasy is 
truth.  That sometimes succeeds with innocent suspects.66 
As has been repeatedly demonstrated, there are serious 
threats to the innocent in contemporary interrogation techniques 
and their judicial condonation.  People confess to crimes that 
they did not commit.67  Some do this for publicity and attention,68 
others because “God” told them to,69 others to escape the pres-
sures of interrogation,70 others because the police persuaded 
 
 63 Id. at 449–55. 
 64 See White, supra note 41, at 1217–18. 
 65 See Edward Wyatt, Publisher Calls Book a Confession by O.J. Simpson, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2006, at C1. 
 66 See, e.g., JOAN BARTHEL, A DEATH IN CANAAN 49–140 (Dell Publishing Co., Inc. 
1977) (1976) (detailing the interrogation of Peter Reilly about the death of his mother); 
JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN 87–93 (2006).  A related technique, not noted by the 
Court in Miranda, is to suggest to the suspect that he must have “blacked out” or had a 
“memory problem” that does not allow him to consciously recall what he did.  GISLI 
GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS AND TESTIMONY 228 
(1992). 
 67 GUDJONSSON, supra note 66, at ch. 10; Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The 
Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in 
the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998); Steven 
A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 
N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004).  The basic strategy of modern interrogation is to persuade the 
suspect that it is in his interest to confess.  The first stage in that process is to convince 
him that his conviction is certain regardless of what he says or does.  The second is to of-
fer him inducements to persuade him that it will be beneficial to him to confess.  Id. at 
914–15. 
 68 Among the confessions that are internally generated and not in any sense the 
product of interrogation pressures are those motivated by a desire for notoriety.  See GUD-
JONSSON, supra note 67, at 226.  About 200 people confessed to the Lindbergh kidnapping.  
See Alan W. Scheflin, Book Review, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1293, 1296 (1998) (reviewing 
CRIMINAL DETECTION AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIME (David V. Canter & Laurence J. 
Alison eds., 1997)).  A recent example is John Mark Karr, who confessed to the murder of 
JonBenet Ramsey but was released when it was determined that there was no corrobora-
tion and he could not even be placed in Colorado when the crime occurred.  See Judith 
Graham, Confession Raises More Questions than Answers: Prosecutor Cautious as Doubts 
Are Raised on Suspect’s Story, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 18, 2006, at A1, A8. 
 69 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 161 (1986). 
 70 See Innocence Project, Understand the Causes, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
understand/False-Confessions.php (last visited Apr. 2, 2007). 
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them that it was in their interest to falsely confess,71 and still 
others because they have been at least temporarily persuaded of 
their guilt by skilled practitioners of coercive persuasion, i.e., po-
lice interrogators.72  We have no way to quantify reliably what 
percentage of all confessions given are false, since there is rarely 
any DNA or other forensic evidence to refute the confession.  
However, in several studies of innocents wrongly convicted, 
stretching over nearly a century, false confessions have been ob-
tained in 14–25% of the cases.73  Among those persons who have 
been convicted and later exonerated by DNA results, about one-
fourth had confessed.74 
Stripped of its muscle by narrowing interpretations, 
Miranda not only provides no significant protection for suspects, 
guilty or innocent, it actually assists the police in their efforts to 
convict whomever they believe to be guilty.75  If the Court had 
not imposed the warnings on the police, they would eventually 
have discovered their value and given them anyway.  It is no ab-
erration that Miranda is being copied all over the world and that 
the police and prosecutors like it.76  Miranda no longer has any-
thing significant to say about the legality of interrogation meth-
ods or the reliability of confessions.  Yet since Miranda has been 
a major focus of debates about confessions, it serves mainly to 
distract lawyers, scholars and judges from considering the real 
problem of interrogation, which is how to convict the guilty while 
 
 71 Id. 
 72 See id.  
 73 Drizin & Leo, supra note 67, at 902. 
 74 Innocence Project, supra note 70. 
 75 The problem of false confessions is exacerbated by the apparent fact that police, 
who typically presume guilt of the suspect until persuaded otherwise, surprisingly, have 
no special skill in evaluating credibility.  Chet Pager reports the following on that subject: 
  One widely cited 1991 study assessed the lie detection ability of 509 sub-
jects, including officers from the CIA, FBI, National Security Agency, Drug En-
forcement Agency, California police, judges, psychiatrists, and college students.  
Accuracy rates ranged from 53% to 58%, with no expert group performing sig-
nificantly better than untrained college students.  Previous studies involving 
federal law enforcement officers, police, detectives, and investigators found 
similar accuracy results, which fell in the mid-fifties.  Despite their increased 
confidence, experts are no better than inexperienced civilians at distinguishing 
truth from falsehood, and some studies have found that experts, despite (or be-
cause of) their years of experience, perform even worse than  laypersons.   
Chet K.W. Pager, Blind Justice, Colored Truths and the Veil of Ignorance, 41 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 373, 380–81 (2005). 
 76 See All Experts, Miranda Warning: Encyclopedia, http://en.allexperts.com/e/m/mi/ 
miranda_warning.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2007); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda 
Revisited, supra note 19, at 666 (1996).  In 1988, an American Bar Association survey 
found that an overwhelming majority of police, prosecutors and judges surveyed reported 
that compliance with Miranda did not hinder law enforcement efforts.  Leo, supra note 
21, at 1022.  
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protecting the innocent.77 
Many scholars have proposed changes in the law to increase 
the reliability of confessions and to reduce the pressures of inter-
rogation.  They include putting time limits on interrogation,78 
putting lawyers in the interrogation room,79 and prohibiting some 
or all police fraud and trickery.80  These proposals have varying 
merit in that some would reduce risks to the innocent while in-
terfering minimally with efforts to convict the guilty, while oth-
ers, such as putting lawyers in the interrogation room, would 
gravely curtail the utility of police interrogation.  An overarching 
problem with all of these proposals is the presumed remedy for 
their violation: suppressing the defendant’s statements.  Such a 
drastic remedy chills much of what might otherwise be warm 
support for some of these proposals. 
IV.  MORE NUANCED REMEDIES ARE NEEDED 
We need to face the fact that judges simply are not going to 
throw out confessions just because psychological coercion was 
used or some rule relating to interrogation was not fully obeyed.81  
 
 77 Some might quibble that the “real problem” is not convicting the guilty while pro-
tecting the innocent but rather protecting the right of the suspect to be free from coercion 
that renders his statement “involuntary.”  I acknowledge that this is a problem, too, but I 
do not think it is of the same magnitude as my version.  In any event, the two problems 
overlap considerably.  Another bothersome concern, outside the scope of this article, is the 
“distributive justice” problem described by William Stuntz.  Noting that Miranda substi-
tutes a right of silence for a system that regulates interrogations, he argues that this sub-
stitution rewards sophisticates who understand the interrogation system and does virtu-
ally nothing for those who, by reason of limited education, inexperience, and other 
disadvantages, do not know what they are getting into when they agree to be interviewed.  
Stuntz, supra note 30, at 978. 
 78 Apart from mentally ill people who confess for irrational reasons, the innocent 
who confess usually do so only after lengthy interrogation.  Professor White recommended 
an upper limit on interrogation of six hours, after earlier suggesting a five-hour limit.  
Compare White, supra note 52, at 2049, with Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the 
Constitution: Safeguards against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
105, 145 (1997).  See also infra notes 111–14 and accompanying text, stating that over 
90% of interrogations last no more than two hours whereas the interrogations that pro-
duce false confessions typically last three times that long, or more. 
 79 Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to 
Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1842 (1987); see also Akhil Reed Amar & 
Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 857, 858 (1995) (allowing a judge to compel answers from the defendant). 
 80 Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 
602 (1979).  But see Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far is 
Too Far? 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1209 (2001) (arguing that “additional limits on deception 
are unwarranted”). 
 81 The same fate can be predicted for proposed “reliability hearings,” where, as a 
condition to admissibility, the trial judge holds a hearing and finds the defendant’s state-
ment to be reliable.  For details of one such innovative proposal, see Sharon L. Davies, 
The Reality of False Confessions—Lessons of the Central Park Jogger Case, 30 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 209, 241–43 (2006).  I support pretrial reliability hearings not be-
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The conventional remedy for “involuntary” confessions, Miranda 
violations, and other illegal interrogation methods is to exclude 
the confession from evidence82 and, in at least some cases, to ex-
clude derivative evidence as well.83  An exclusionary ruling keeps 
probative evidence from the jury and sometimes threatens to de-
stroy the prosecution’s case and free a guilty and dangerous de-
fendant.  That probably does not happen three times a year, de-
spite more than a million felony prosecutions.84  Focusing on 
Miranda compliance and an undemanding “voluntariness” re-
quirement assures that virtually all confessions will be admissi-
ble in evidence, but does nothing to help the jury determine how 
much weight to give to incriminating statements made by the ac-
cused.  We need to think about more nuanced remedies that will 
help the jury accurately evaluate the reliability of such state-
ments.  Three candidates—videorecording, expert testimony and 
cautionary instructions—are briefly discussed below. 
Although it is possible to convict many defendants without 
their confessions, there is no doubt that confessions are often 
necessary for convictions.85  They are powerfully incriminating: 
juries almost always convict a defendant who has confessed, even 
when there is little or no corroborating evidence and even where 
there is evidence of innocence.86 Jurors are not aware of how un-
reliable evidence of confessions or incriminating statements can 
be.87  First, there is uncertainty about what the defendant actu-
ally said to the police and in what context.  This is true even if a 
written confession is obtained.  If the only way to reconstruct the 
interrogations and their context is through the memory of those 
present—the police and the defendant—there is great risk of er-
 
cause I think they will result in exclusion of unreliable confessions—they will not—but 
because they will provide pretrial discovery that will help the defendant attack the reli-
ability of the statement before the jury.  If the interrogation is recorded, however, the 
need for other evidence related to the interrogation will be minimized. 
 82 Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156 (1990). 
 83 See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391–92 (1920) (hold-
ing that information obtained illegally cannot be used for any purpose).  But see Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985), where the Court distinguishes between “prophylactic” 
violations of Miranda, to which the “fruit of the poisonous tree” prohibition does not ap-
ply, and “coercion of a confession,” to which the prohibition does apply. 
 84 See supra note 51. 
 85 Virtually all who write about confessions concede this.  Confessions are less im-
portant where there is strong corroboration and much more important where there is lit-
tle, and it is in the latter case that the primary risk of false confession exists.   
 86 Drizin & Leo, supra note 73, at 962; Leo & Ofshe, supra note 67, at 481; Saul M. 
Kassin & Katherine Neumann, On the Power of Confession Evidence: An Empirical Test of 
the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 470 (1997); Saul M. 
Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental Test of the 
“Harmless Error” Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 42 (1997). 
 87 Leo & Ofshe, supra note 87, at 962. 
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ror.88  Memories of the details of conversations are shockingly 
unreliable—worse by far than eyewitness identification memo-
ries.89  Apart from inaccuracies, testimony about interrogations is 
necessarily incomplete.  The subtle pressures, assurances and 
deceits that accompany police interrogation will inevitably be left 
out of the story or at least minimized.90  This is exacerbated by 
the fact that the defendant is often neither very bright nor very 
articulate, and he rarely has anyone to corroborate his story. 
A.  Videorecording 
Perhaps the least controversial remedy for abuses in the in-
terrogation room is compulsory videorecording of the interroga-
tion.91  This has been done in England since 1984.92  Alaska re-
quires it as a matter of due process and has been videorecording 
for more than two decades.93  Many police departments through-
out the country have long been videorecording selectively.94  An 
Illinois Commission headed by Thomas P. Sullivan recently 
spoke to 238 law enforcement agencies in thirty-eight states that 
currently record custodial interviews in at least some felony in-
vestigations.  The Commission found that “[t]heir experiences 
have been uniformly positive.”95  Among the advantages to law 
enforcement are that the detectives can focus on the suspect 
rather than taking copious notes while interrogating;96 when the 
police review the recordings later, they often observe incriminat-
 
 88 “Interrogation still takes place in privacy.  Privacy results in secrecy and this in 
turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation 
rooms.”  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966). 
 89 Steven B. Duke, Ann Seung-Eun Lee & Chet K.W. Pager, A Picture’s Worth a 
Thousand Words: Conversational Versus Eyewitness Testimony in Criminal Convictions, 
44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 90 The temptation of the police to “testily” (that is, to lie on the witness stand) to 
support the admissibility or reliability of evidence is also a factor that cannot be ignored.  
See generally Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of 
Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 234 
(1998). 
 91 See Yale Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. Williams—A Hard look at a Discomfiting 
Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209, 236–43 (1977); Gail Johnson, False Confessions and Fundamen-
tal Fairness: The Need for Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 6 B.U. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 719, 735–37 (1997).  See also cases and other authorities collected in Common-
wealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 529–31 (Mass. 2004).  “Videotaping” is no 
longer the appropriate description since videorecording is increasingly done digitally. 
 92 Johnson, supra note 91, at 745. 
 93 Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Alaska 1985). 
 94 William A. Geller, Videotaping Interrogations and Confessions (1992), reprinted in 
THE MIRANDA DEBATE, supra note 6, at 303, 304–05. 
 95 THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. ON WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS, POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS (2004), 
available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/documents/ 
SullivanReport.pdf [hereinafter SULLIVAN REPORT]. 
 96 Id. at 10. 
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ing statements that they would have forgotten or not perceived in 
the first place,97 recordings “dramatically reduce the number of 
defense motions to suppress statements and confessions,”98 and 
increase the number of guilty pleas.99  Judges prefer the re-
cordings to having to hear and resolve conflicts in testimony 
about the interrogation and its results.100  It appears that the 
only opposition from law enforcement is from those who have not 
tried videorecording.101 
A common objection to a recording requirement for custodial 
interrogations is that when suspects are informed or realize the 
session is to be recorded, they will refuse to be interviewed or will 
at least “clam up” and become untalkative.  But according to the 
Sullivan Report, these concerns are “unfounded.”102  First, most 
states do not require that the suspect be informed that he is be-
ing recorded.103  Even when the suspects are informed, they usu-
ally do not object to being recorded and there is little evidence 
that their responses to interrogation are adversely affected by 
knowledge of the recording.  Once the interviews get underway, 
initial hesitation fades and the suspects focus on the subject of 
the interview.104  In those rare instances when suspects object to 
the recording, the interview can proceed without recording, pro-
vided the objection is documented.105 
Another concern frequently heard is that the police will try 
to circumvent the requirement by conducting their interrogations 
off camera and will only use the recording to preserve the results 
of the earlier interrogations, a “recap.”  If the entire custodial in-
terrogation is required to be videorecorded, however, the recap 
approach would be unlawful and it is unlikely that the recap 
could be passed off as an entire interrogation.  Thus, the only ef-
fective way to circumvent the recording requirement would be to 
interrogate in a non-custodial setting.  This might be considered 
analogous to interrogating “outside of Miranda,” getting the con-
fession, then Mirandizing the suspect and having him repeat 
 
 97 Id. at 11.  This would seem especially important where the credibility of the con-
fession rests on the claim that the suspect provided details of the crime that he could not 
have learned anywhere but at the crime scene. 
 98 Id. at 8. 
 99 Id. at 12. 
 100 Id. at 13. 
 101 An earlier study found the same thing: law enforcement opposition to taping came 
mostly from those who were unfamiliar with the practice.  Geller, supra note 94, at 305. 
 102 SULLIVAN REPORT, supra note 95, at 20.  Cassell & Hayman, supra note 16, at 897 
(finding no inhibiting effects when suspects in their sample were recorded). 
 103 SULLIVAN REPORT, supra note 95, at 20. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 22. 
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it.106  Some courts have disapproved of that stratagem107 and 
similar rulings could be made when recording is involved.  On 
the other hand, as the Court in Miranda correctly implied, the 
dangers of involuntary confessions are relatively remote in non-
custodial interrogations.  I see no profound objection to allowing 
the police to interrogate briefly on the street or in a suspect’s 
home and to using the fruits thereof either as evidence at trial or 
to facilitate on-camera interrogations in a custodial setting. 
The temptations to evade recording requirements seem not 
to be a major problem in those jurisdictions that require the re-
cording of interrogations.  The advantages of recording the actual 
interrogation rather than merely its fruits are substantial.  For 
one thing, it avoids claims of off-camera threats, promises and 
other improprieties.108  If a suspect begins the interrogation with 
evasions and lies, then admits the crime without extensive prod-
ding and cajolery, a stronger piece of evidence has been created 
than if merely the results are recorded.109  More than ninety per-
cent of normal interrogations last less than two hours110 and it 
seems unlikely that in most of those interrogations it was neces-
sary for the police to employ techniques that were extreme or 
despicable.111  In a typical interrogation, incriminating state-
 
 106 Another way police go “outside Miranda” is to continue to question the suspect 
after he invokes his right to silence or to consult counsel.  If an incriminating statement 
follows, it can be used to impeach the suspect at trial.   See Charles D. Weisselberg, Sav-
ing Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 189–92 (1998). 
 107 See, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
 108 SULLIVAN REPORT, supra note 95, at 17.  Even where recording was not manda-
tory, the consensus of law enforcement officers queried by the Sullivan Commission was 
that recording the entire interrogation rather than the final statements was preferable.  
In addition to avoiding claims of off-camera skullduggery, full recording also defeats a de-
fense claim that “negative inferences should be drawn because the entire session could 
have been recorded by the flick of a switch, whereas the detectives chose instead to record 
only a rehearsed final statement.”  Id. at 17–18. 
 109 A dramatic example of the importance of recording the entire interrogation is the 
Central Park Jogger Case, where the police conducted unrecorded interrogations followed 
by taped final confessions.  The defendants in that case were later shown to have been 
convicted falsely.  See Crime, False Confessions and Videotape, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2001, 
at A22; Saul Kassin, False Confessions and the Jogger Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2002, at 
A31. 
 110 Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 19, at 279 (noting that of 182  po-
lice interrogations observed in the early 1990s, more than 70% lasted less than an hour; 
92% less than two hours); Barrett, Jr., supra note 28, at 42 (noting that nearly half of all 
pre-Miranda interrogations were completed in 30 minutes or less, nearly three-quarters 
in an hour or less, 95% in less than two hours). 
 111 In a study of 182 actual interrogations in a major urban police department, con-
ducted by forty-five different detectives, Richard A. Leo observed and catalogued the tac-
tics employed.  Most involved some negative incentives (suggestions that there is no other 
plausible course of action) and positive incentives (suggestions that the suspect will feel 
better or otherwise benefit if he confesses).  In 90% of the interrogations, the detectives 
confronted the suspect with incriminating evidence, usually true (85%) but sometimes 
false (30%).  The longest interrogation lasted four-and-a-half hours.  Leo, Inside the Inter-
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ments are obtained without extreme conduct that would seri-
ously embarrass the police or that would create grave doubt 
about the voluntariness or reliability of the statements.112  There-
fore, to interrogate and then recap and record is, in most cases, a 
duplication of effort.  The kind of interrogation that is likely to 
produce a false confession—a lengthy interrogation113 suffused 
with trickery, cajolery, good guys and bad guys, fake evidence 
and so forth—is surely uncommon in most police departments 
and the police will rarely, if ever, expect to engage in such an in-
terrogation at the outset.  Accordingly, when they would wish to 
interrogate off camera, it is usually too late: the interrogation has 
already occurred on camera. 
Videorecording will not always help the defendant.   Experi-
ence strongly suggests that more often it will help the prosecu-
tion convict him.  But in those exceptional cases where intense 
psychological pressure has been employed or there is little cor-
roborating evidence, there is no substitute for a videorecording of 
the entire interrogation.  Courts should not wait for legislatures 
to require such recording.  They should encourage it either by 
holding that it is required by due process, as the Alaska Court 
did,114 or in the exercise of their supervisory power, as the Min-
nesota Supreme Court did,115 or as in Massachusetts, by instruct-
ing juries that “because of the absence of any recording of the in-
terrogation in the case before them, they should weigh evidence 
of the defendant’s alleged statement with great caution and 
care.”116 
 
rogation Room, supra note 19, at 278–79.  Some police fear that these common tactics, 
especially minimizing the moral seriousness of the offense, will have to be curtailed if 
they record.  This concern does not loom large in the Sullivan Report.  SULLIVAN REPORT, 
supra note 95, at 22. 
 112 Of the 182 interrogations observed by Richard A. Leo in the early 1990s, only four 
of them involved what Leo regarded as “coercive” methods.   Leo, Inside the Interrogation 
Room, supra note 19, at 282–83. 
 113 In a study of 125 “proven false confessions,” Steven Drizin and Richard Leo found 
that in the 44 confessions in which the length of interrogation was determinable, 84% 
lasted more than six hours, “34% between six and twelve hours; 39% between twelve and 
twenty-four hours; 7% between twenty-four and forty-eight hours; 2% between forty-eight 
and seventy-two hours; and 2% between seventy-two and ninety-six hours.  The average 
length of interrogation was 16.3 hours and the median length of interrogation was twelve 
hours.”  Drizin & Leo, supra note 67, at 948–49. 
 114 Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1162 (Alaska 1985).  It would not be a major 
stretch to find a due process violation in the failure to record an interrogation.  The Su-
preme Court has intimated that it would be a due process violation to destroy or fail to 
preserve evidence if the police did so in order to gain an advantage over the defendant.  
See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988). 
 115 State v. Scales, 518 N.W. 2d 587, 589 (Minn. 1994). 
 116 Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533–34 (Mass. 2004).  A Ca-
nadian court recently held that a failure to record an interrogation warrants a jury in-
struction that the failure constitutes “an important factor to consider in deciding whether 
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 B.  Expert Witnesses 
Given the ignorance of juries about the innocents’ propensity 
to confess falsely and the evidence that such confessions are 
much more common than was supposed prior to the DNA revolu-
tion, one might expect courts routinely to admit the testimony of 
psychologists in cases where there is a plausible claim that the 
confession was coerced, or in any event unreliable because of the 
methods and circumstances under which it was obtained.  Such 
an expectation would be premature. 
The strongest case for admissibility of expert confession tes-
timony would appear to be the psychiatrist or psychologist who 
treated the confessor before he was interrogated or at least con-
ducted extensive psychological testing and examinations thereaf-
ter.  Such an expert could testify to the psychological traits of the 
defendant that would incline him toward giving a false confes-
sion.  Is he pathologically gullible or deferential?  Does he have a 
perverse need to please his interrogators, such that he might con-
fess to a crime just to please them? How intelligent is he? Such 
testimony would certainly provide the jurors with evidence that 
would not otherwise be known to them and that any rational per-
son would consider relevant in assessing the reliability of the 
confession.  The Supreme Court declared such evidence immate-
rial, however, on the issue of voluntariness.  In Colorado v. Con-
nelly, the Court held that coercive police activity alone deter-
mines involuntariness.117  Unless the police were aware of some 
special vulnerability of the suspect and exploited it, the Court 
stated, his vulnerabilities have nothing to do with whether his 
confession is voluntary or involuntary.  In Connelly, the defen-
dant approached a police officer and confessed to a murder.  
Later, at the police station, he confessed to a child’s murder.  The 
following day, he told the police he had confessed because voices 
had told him to do so.  A psychiatrist who examined him testified 
that he was psychotic and was following instructions from the 
“voice of God.” Accordingly, the psychiatrist testified, these 
 
to rely on the officer’s version of the statement.”  R. v. Wilson, No. C42952, [2006] O. J. 
No. 2478: 2006 ON.C. LEXIS 2388, at *18 (Ont. Ct. App. June 21, 2006).  In Arizona v. 
Youngblood, the police failed to refrigerate semen samples in a sexual assault case.  One 
factor that led Justice Stevens to concur in the Court’s judgment that due process was not 
violated was the fact that the trial judge instructed the jury, “If you find that the State 
has . . . allowed to be destroyed or lost any evidence whose content or quality are in issue, 
you may infer that the true fact is against the State’s interest.”  Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 
59–60 (Stevens, J., concurring).  Given the ease with which interrogations can be videore-
corded, a similar instruction, adapted to the evidence lost by failure to record, would seem 
appropriate in most cases where interrogations were not recorded. 
 117 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). 
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“command hallucinations” deprived the defendant of his own vo-
litional abilities.118  The Colorado courts held that the confessions 
were involuntary but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
it does not matter how psychotic the defendant is or if he acted 
on God’s orders.  His confessions were still voluntary, as were his 
Miranda waivers, as long as there was no police overreaching, 
threats or intimidation.119  Thus, psychological evidence will 
rarely be admissible on the issue of the voluntariness of a confes-
sion. 
Fortunately, the Court also held, in Crane v. Kentucky, that 
there is a due process right to introduce evidence that a confes-
sion is not credible.120  Whether a confession is voluntary is one 
issue; whether it is true is quite another.  Even though the trial 
judge may determine voluntariness on her own and not put that 
issue to the jury, she may not arrogate to herself the reliability 
issue.  According to the Court, the right to present a defense 
“would be an empty one if the State were permitted to exclude 
competent, reliable evidence bearing on the credibility of a con-
fession when such evidence is central to the defendant’s claim of 
innocence.”121  It seems clear, therefore, that any competent ex-
pert evidence bearing on the particular defendant’s vulnerabili-
ties or propensities as they relate to the reliability of his confes-
sion should be admissible.  In United States v. Shay, for example, 
the defense sought to elicit testimony from a psychiatrist that 
Shay suffered from “pseudologia fantastica,” a symptom of which 
was to “spin out webs of lies which are ordinarily self-
aggrandizing and serve to place him in the center of attention.”122  
The First Circuit held that such evidence is admissible to attack 
the credibility of a confession.  The Seventh Circuit reached a 
similar conclusion in United States v. Hall.123  In both cases, how-
ever, the testimony held admissible was “medical” testimony, de-
scribing symptoms of a “mental disorder.”  A defendant whose 
gullibility or suggestibility falls short of an identifiable, recog-
nized pathology still might find himself without admissible ex-
pert assistance about his psychological propensities.124 
 
 118 Id. at 161. 
 119 Id. at 162, 167. 
 120 476 U.S. 683, 690–91 (1986). 
 121 Id. at 690. 
 122 57 F.3d 126, 129–30, 132 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 123 93 F.3d 1337, 1345–46 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the defendant was entitled to 
present evidence that he had a personality disorder that made him pathologically suscep-
tible to suggestion). 
 124 United States v. DiDomenico, 985 F.2d 1159, 1164 (2d Cir. 1993).  Evidence of an 
abnormally low intelligence, however, is often admitted.  See People v. Gilliam, 670 
N.E.2d 606, 614 (Ill. 1996).  There are some instances where the courts are correct in ex-
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Also problematic is testimony offered by a psychologist pri-
marily to educate the jury about the psychological factors that 
sometimes lead to false confessions.  Some courts think such tes-
timony “invades the province of the jury” because it does not tell 
the jurors anything that they do not already know.125  This is, of 
course, nonsense and many courts are beginning to admit this 
evidence, subject to some limitations.  In United States v. Hall,126 
for example, the district court on remand found that the testi-
mony of social psychologist Richard Ofshe met the requirements 
of Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and Daubert127 because it was 
“based upon systematic observation of data to which the jury is 
not privy,”128 and permitted him to testify “that false confessions 
do exist, that they are associated with the use of certain police in-
terrogation techniques, and that certain of those techniques” 
were used in the defendant’s case.129 
The reasoning of the decisions admitting expert testimony in 
confession cases is impressive and the trend seems clearly in the 
direction of admissibility.130  However, although most people who 
falsely confess are neither mentally ill nor cognitively impaired, 
“the vast majority of reported false confessions are from cogni-
tively and intellectually normal individuals.”131  The interroga-
tion techniques that produce most false confessions were devel-
oped for, and are employed against, rational suspects.  Thus, the 
defense will often have to rely on the testimony of a social psy-
chologist rather than a psychiatrist and on generalizations rather 
than specific, case-related factors with medical terminology.   
One reason that such testimony does not often arise is that 
most of the relevant facts concerning the interrogation, to which 
the psychological principles can be applied, are not available.  
 
cluding the evidence, e.g., testimony from an expert that the threat of death by electrocu-
tion can lead to a false confession.  Upholding exclusion of the testimony, the Florida 
court said, “[T]he jury was capable of assessing without the aid of an expert witness that 
the threat of death in the electric chair may have a coercive effect . . . .”  Bullard v. State, 
650 So. 2d 631, 632 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).  Some courts create something akin to a 
Catch-22 when they refuse to allow an expert to opine on the reliability or falsity of the 
particular confession before the court, see People v. Page, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 898, 899 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1991), and when they exclude the proffered testimony because it does not opine on 
the unreliability or falsity of the confession, see State v. Tellier, 526 A.2d 941, 944 (Me. 
1987); State v. Wilson, 456 N.E.2d 1287, 1293 (Ohio 1982). 
 125 E.g., State v. Cobb, 43 P.3d 855, 869 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002); see also State v. Davis, 
32 S.W.3d 603, 608–09 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). 
 126 974 F. Supp. 1198, 1205 (C. D. Ill. 1997). 
 127 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 128 Hall, 974 F. Supp. at 1206. 
 129 Id. at 1205. 
 130 Nadia Soree, When the Innocent Speak: False Confessions, Constitutional Safe-
guards, and the Role of Expert Testimony, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191, 262–63 (2005). 
 131 Drizin & Leo, supra note 67, at 920. 
551-578 DUKE.DOC 8/3/2007 2:52:27 AM 
576 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 10:551 
 
The police deny that there was much in the way of psychological 
coercion and the defendant either does not testify at all or, be-
cause he is inarticulate, unintelligent and unattractive—and be-
cause of his obvious self-interest—is of little value to the defense 
in reconstructing the interrogation.  As the police begin to record 
their interrogations, the importance of social psychologist testi-
mony will grow considerably.  Many recorded interrogations will 
provide fodder for expert testimony.   
Another consideration, often unstated but omnipresent, is 
the expense factor.  About eighty-five percent of criminal defen-
dants are indigent.132  If they are to have expert assistance in at-
tacking their confessions, the experts will have to be provided at 
state expense.  The viewing and analysis of the video and the re-
lated expert testimony will sometimes also consume considerable 
court time.  That may explain why the judiciary appears less 
than enthusiastic about psychological experts in confession cases. 
C.  Cautionary Instructions 
One remedy for unreliable confessions that neither takes up 
much time nor costs any money is cautionary jury instructions.   
Much of the experience of miscarriages of justice and the findings 
of social psychological experiments can be distilled in a jury in-
struction, once judges have taken judicial notice of such experi-
ence and findings.  Counsel can then argue the applicability of 
the principles to the particular facts of the case.   As videore-
cording of interrogations becomes more common and expert 
analysis thereof admissible, the value of alternative cautionary 
instructions in confession cases will become obvious.   Scholars 
and judges should get together and work out some appropriate 
instructions to guide the jury in its evaluation of the credibility of 
confessions and incriminating statements. 
CONCLUSION 
Miranda, on balance, helps neither the guilty nor the inno-
cent avoid conviction.  When we consider not only the effect 
Miranda has on interrogations but its impact on juries and 
judges, it is clear that Miranda created a large lacuna where pro-
tections against unreliable statements attributed to the accused 
are badly needed.  Rather than tweaking Miranda, reformulating 
the warnings or tightening waiver requirements, we should focus 
on ways to help the jury determine whether incriminating state-
ments were made and what weight should be given to them.  Re-
 
 132 S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 30 (1995). 
551-578 DUKE.DOC 8/3/2007 2:52:27 AM 
2007] Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the Guilty? 577 
 
quiring videorecording, liberalizing admissibility of experts, and 
delivering specific cautionary instructions are far more promising 
remedies. 
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